The Tactical Situation
Thua Thien Province early 1968
( click on maps to enlarge )
III MAF ( 3rd Marine Amphibious Force ) intelligence as well as MACV ( Military Assistance Command Vietnam ) held
the belief that the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Spring Offensive of 1968 would take place in the remote regions of the
western mountains along the border with Laos. These assumptions were based upon the enemy activities of late summer and
fall, 1967. During that period the enemy had launched multiple regimental size attacks across the border against US and
Republic of Vietnam (RVN) installations. There was also activity in NW I Corps where a major concentration of enemy
forces were building around the US Marine base at Khe Sanh. The reasonable conclusion was that this would be the
"epicenter" of next years activities. The western mountain regions of I Corps was mostly under the control of the NVA and
VC where the infrastructure was non-existent and what few roads there were, none would support military traffic.
QL 547 was one of those roads, it was not the main road from Hue City to
the A Shau Valley, it was the only road! Located on the border with Laos,
logistical support into the A Shau would better come from the west, Laos
and the Ho Chi Minh Trail, rather than from the east. Operation "Cumber-
land Trail" was conceived as an engineering operation with the mission to
rebuild QL 547 to a condition that would sustain military traffic. Work was
to start at the operations base "Rock Crusher" located on the west side of the
Song Huong ( Perfume River ) about four miles SW of Hue City. Building
the road from the east toward the west, the construction forces were to be
immediately followed up by heavy combat formations tasked to secure the
A Shau Valley and to engage and contain the expected enemy attacks to be
launched across the border.
During the month of January, the units designated to form "Cumberland Trail" gathered at the Rock Crusher location.
Operational security was charged to 1st Bn 1st Marines and "C" Company was assigned duty at the "Crusher", the mission
of artillery fire support was "B" Btry 1st Bn 11th Marines and Engineering was "B" Company 9th Eng Bn.
January 30th marked the beginning of the NVA "Spring Offensive", however, it did not manifest itself in the remote western
mountains as foreseen, but instead it came on with a bang right under our noses. In one night every Provincial Capital as
well as any other town or village of significance across the entire length of South Vietnam, came under attack. Hue City,
the historic cultural capital was overun on the 31st by a reinforced NVA Division. This was unexpected until almost the
last minute, only at the very last did General Truong, CG of the 1st ARVN Div, suspect that something was amiss. The
element of surprise greatly enhanced by the following factors:
In the past Hue City, because of it's historical value and beauty, had been mostly protected by both sides,
The attack was launched on the first day of the Tet Holiday, a mutually agreed upon truce period.
Overnight Hue was occupied by over 12,000 enemy soldiers. The only friendly installations not captured during the night
were the MACV compound, located in the New City a few blocks south of the Song Huong and the 1st ARVN Division HQ
located in the Citadel. Both locations valiantly holding on by their fingernails.
The surprise attack in Hue certainly had an effect on the "Cumberland Trail" forces out at the Rock Crusher. The mission
had changed, no longer to "open 547 to the A Shau for the use of US forces" but to "act as a blocking force to deny the use
of 547 to the NVA forces". The Rock Crusher ceased being an operational base for an engineering operation and became a
fire support base for forces engaged in the Battle for Hue City and surrounding areas. Bravo Btry 1/11 was busy full time
providing artillery support.
The high rate of expenditure of artillery ammunition and the remote location of Firebase Rock Crusher created a tough
logistical problem. This situation was seriously exacerbated by the large number of NVA formations located between
the Rock Crusher and logistical support at Phu Bai.
This was the situation on February 7th, when a resupply convoy of 16 trucks, 1 jeep and 2 Ontos made it out to the Rock
Crusher with a large supply of ammunition for the 105 howitzers. Unfortunately the convoy was carrying only a minimum
of food and small arms ammo, the three units at the firebase were low on all these items and OUT of "C" rations and some
crucial medical supplies.
It was decided that "B" Co 9th Eng would attach an additional 4 trucks to the
convoy that would travel to Phu Bai, load up the needed supplies and return
as soon as security could be arranged.
The enlarged convoy now consisting of 20 trucks 1 jeep and 2 Ontos, depart-
ed the "Crusher" and crossed the pontoon bridge at about 14:30 that afternoon.
The first incident occurred when the lead truck struck a mine ( see map ) this
caused the convoy to stop with the rear elements backed up beyond a crude
culvert bypass built around a very light bridge so as to allow passage for the
heavy military vehicles. After a delay of only a few minutes the rear elements
were taken under intense fire, so intense at the bypass that the rear Ontos and the last truck were both destroyed. The
remaining convoy pressed forward with the rear group of trucks engaged in a running fight along the road, losing 2 more
trucks. No one was aware of the plight of the Marines at the bypass, in fact no one even knew that the last vehicles were not
following until they all backed up at the second ambush site. The Graveyard, here was the primary ambush where the bulk
of the NVA forces were concentrated. This ambush site was tactically arranged around a very sharp 90 deg turn, so sharp
that the large military trucks had difficulty negotiating. Vehicles stalled and piled up on each other and the fight raged on for
over 3 hours. Were it not for the reaction forces, one from the Rock Crusher the other from Phu Bai, we could have lost all
personnel.
Best described, this was a classic ambush utilizing a mine ( command detonated? ) to disorganise, a rear blocking force
"The Bypass", and a primary ambush site "The Graveyard". The total ambush was quite long, covering about 1 1/2 miles
road distance with the primary force and rear blocking force far enough apart to make one tend to think of two distinct
ambushes. It seemed to have been well planned and executed with only a few glaring deficiencies:
There was a clear lack of communication between the rear blocking force and the primary force. This is substantiated
by after action analysis indicating that the entire NVA force throughout the operational area was suffering from serious
communication problems.
We do not believe that the fight at the Bypass was intended to be initiated when it was, but instead that they planed to
let the convoy pass unscathed and then set up blocking positions across the Bypass to catch escapees retreating from the
primary action at the Graveyard. We do have information that indicates PFC Lindquist actually initiated the action by firing
on several NVA soldiers from the back of Sgt Hedlund's stopped truck.
These NVA units had been engaged in active combat for a week and it appears they were also low on ammunition
and supplies.
The following pages offer a very detailed description of the combat action at both sites. From photographic evidence and
specific personal knowledge we have been able to locate and identify the final position of most of the vehicles from the
convoy. We have photo coverage of many of the battle damaged vehicles ( taken 2 - 3 weeks after the action ) and many
statements from Marines that were fighting at different locations along the battlefield. We have designed this section for
ease of use by the visitor, to provide access to maximum information while maintaining continuity with the map and other
physical relationships. The section is constructed around a central map "Ambush Sites". This map carries links to the other
interactive maps which in turn carry links to specific photos and more detailed information.
Again everything underlined is a link.
Thua Thien Province early 1968
( click on maps to enlarge )
III MAF ( 3rd Marine Amphibious Force ) intelligence as well as MACV ( Military Assistance Command Vietnam ) held
the belief that the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Spring Offensive of 1968 would take place in the remote regions of the
western mountains along the border with Laos. These assumptions were based upon the enemy activities of late summer and
fall, 1967. During that period the enemy had launched multiple regimental size attacks across the border against US and
Republic of Vietnam (RVN) installations. There was also activity in NW I Corps where a major concentration of enemy
forces were building around the US Marine base at Khe Sanh. The reasonable conclusion was that this would be the
"epicenter" of next years activities. The western mountain regions of I Corps was mostly under the control of the NVA and
VC where the infrastructure was non-existent and what few roads there were, none would support military traffic.
QL 547 was one of those roads, it was not the main road from Hue City to
the A Shau Valley, it was the only road! Located on the border with Laos,
logistical support into the A Shau would better come from the west, Laos
and the Ho Chi Minh Trail, rather than from the east. Operation "Cumber-
land Trail" was conceived as an engineering operation with the mission to
rebuild QL 547 to a condition that would sustain military traffic. Work was
to start at the operations base "Rock Crusher" located on the west side of the
Song Huong ( Perfume River ) about four miles SW of Hue City. Building
the road from the east toward the west, the construction forces were to be
immediately followed up by heavy combat formations tasked to secure the
A Shau Valley and to engage and contain the expected enemy attacks to be
launched across the border.
During the month of January, the units designated to form "Cumberland Trail" gathered at the Rock Crusher location.
Operational security was charged to 1st Bn 1st Marines and "C" Company was assigned duty at the "Crusher", the mission
of artillery fire support was "B" Btry 1st Bn 11th Marines and Engineering was "B" Company 9th Eng Bn.
January 30th marked the beginning of the NVA "Spring Offensive", however, it did not manifest itself in the remote western
mountains as foreseen, but instead it came on with a bang right under our noses. In one night every Provincial Capital as
well as any other town or village of significance across the entire length of South Vietnam, came under attack. Hue City,
the historic cultural capital was overun on the 31st by a reinforced NVA Division. This was unexpected until almost the
last minute, only at the very last did General Truong, CG of the 1st ARVN Div, suspect that something was amiss. The
element of surprise greatly enhanced by the following factors:
In the past Hue City, because of it's historical value and beauty, had been mostly protected by both sides,
The attack was launched on the first day of the Tet Holiday, a mutually agreed upon truce period.
Overnight Hue was occupied by over 12,000 enemy soldiers. The only friendly installations not captured during the night
were the MACV compound, located in the New City a few blocks south of the Song Huong and the 1st ARVN Division HQ
located in the Citadel. Both locations valiantly holding on by their fingernails.
The surprise attack in Hue certainly had an effect on the "Cumberland Trail" forces out at the Rock Crusher. The mission
had changed, no longer to "open 547 to the A Shau for the use of US forces" but to "act as a blocking force to deny the use
of 547 to the NVA forces". The Rock Crusher ceased being an operational base for an engineering operation and became a
fire support base for forces engaged in the Battle for Hue City and surrounding areas. Bravo Btry 1/11 was busy full time
providing artillery support.
The high rate of expenditure of artillery ammunition and the remote location of Firebase Rock Crusher created a tough
logistical problem. This situation was seriously exacerbated by the large number of NVA formations located between
the Rock Crusher and logistical support at Phu Bai.
This was the situation on February 7th, when a resupply convoy of 16 trucks, 1 jeep and 2 Ontos made it out to the Rock
Crusher with a large supply of ammunition for the 105 howitzers. Unfortunately the convoy was carrying only a minimum
of food and small arms ammo, the three units at the firebase were low on all these items and OUT of "C" rations and some
crucial medical supplies.
It was decided that "B" Co 9th Eng would attach an additional 4 trucks to the
convoy that would travel to Phu Bai, load up the needed supplies and return
as soon as security could be arranged.
The enlarged convoy now consisting of 20 trucks 1 jeep and 2 Ontos, depart-
ed the "Crusher" and crossed the pontoon bridge at about 14:30 that afternoon.
The first incident occurred when the lead truck struck a mine ( see map ) this
caused the convoy to stop with the rear elements backed up beyond a crude
culvert bypass built around a very light bridge so as to allow passage for the
heavy military vehicles. After a delay of only a few minutes the rear elements
were taken under intense fire, so intense at the bypass that the rear Ontos and the last truck were both destroyed. The
remaining convoy pressed forward with the rear group of trucks engaged in a running fight along the road, losing 2 more
trucks. No one was aware of the plight of the Marines at the bypass, in fact no one even knew that the last vehicles were not
following until they all backed up at the second ambush site. The Graveyard, here was the primary ambush where the bulk
of the NVA forces were concentrated. This ambush site was tactically arranged around a very sharp 90 deg turn, so sharp
that the large military trucks had difficulty negotiating. Vehicles stalled and piled up on each other and the fight raged on for
over 3 hours. Were it not for the reaction forces, one from the Rock Crusher the other from Phu Bai, we could have lost all
personnel.
Best described, this was a classic ambush utilizing a mine ( command detonated? ) to disorganise, a rear blocking force
"The Bypass", and a primary ambush site "The Graveyard". The total ambush was quite long, covering about 1 1/2 miles
road distance with the primary force and rear blocking force far enough apart to make one tend to think of two distinct
ambushes. It seemed to have been well planned and executed with only a few glaring deficiencies:
There was a clear lack of communication between the rear blocking force and the primary force. This is substantiated
by after action analysis indicating that the entire NVA force throughout the operational area was suffering from serious
communication problems.
We do not believe that the fight at the Bypass was intended to be initiated when it was, but instead that they planed to
let the convoy pass unscathed and then set up blocking positions across the Bypass to catch escapees retreating from the
primary action at the Graveyard. We do have information that indicates PFC Lindquist actually initiated the action by firing
on several NVA soldiers from the back of Sgt Hedlund's stopped truck.
These NVA units had been engaged in active combat for a week and it appears they were also low on ammunition
and supplies.
The following pages offer a very detailed description of the combat action at both sites. From photographic evidence and
specific personal knowledge we have been able to locate and identify the final position of most of the vehicles from the
convoy. We have photo coverage of many of the battle damaged vehicles ( taken 2 - 3 weeks after the action ) and many
statements from Marines that were fighting at different locations along the battlefield. We have designed this section for
ease of use by the visitor, to provide access to maximum information while maintaining continuity with the map and other
physical relationships. The section is constructed around a central map "Ambush Sites". This map carries links to the other
interactive maps which in turn carry links to specific photos and more detailed information.
Again everything underlined is a link.
